The proliferation of regional economic integration has resulted in a complex and continually expanding network of free trade agreements (FTAs). In explaining the formation of these agreements, the literature has generally focused on the e¤ect of country-pair characteristics and ignored the role of existing FTA network. In this paper we investigate, both theoretically and empirically, how third countries a¤ect nations'incentives to form new FTAs in various types of network. We …nd the e¤ect varies signi…cantly with the network architecture. Compared to an empty network where there is no FTA between countries, having an exclusive FTA with a third country raises a country's incentives to form new FTAs but weakens the incentives of others to reciprocate. A new FTA will therefore only be jointly supported when the country with exclusive FTA partners has a su¢ ciently large market size and high marginal cost of production. In a hub-and-spoke network, however, where two countries are mutually linked to a third country, the existence of the mutual FTA partner raises both nations'incentives to form an agreement leading to an unambiguous increase in the probability of jointly supported FTAs.
Introduction
Multilateral trade liberalization has faced tremendous hurdles in the past decade because of the often competing and contradictory objectives of negotiating members. This has led many countries to seek alternative means of trade liberalization, mostly in the form of bilateral and plurilateral free trade agreements (FTAs). As shown in Figure 1 [ Figure 1 about here]
The goal of this paper is to examine the role of third countries in shaping the incentives of two countries to form new FTAs. Our paper shows that the e¤ect of third countries depends crucially on the architecture of the FTA network. To draw out the third-country e¤ect in a transparent manner, we focus on a three-country model. 2 There are three types of networks that are of interest in this case and are shown in Figure 2 . We will be interested in country a and country b's incentives to form an FTA as a function of their links to the third country c. In Figure 2 (i), we have an empty network where there is no FTA among countries. In Figure 2 (ii), countries a and c are linked through an FTA and form an exclusive network. 3 Figure 2 (iii) depicts the case of a hub-and-spoke network where country c has an FTA with both a and b but the latter two do not have an FTA with each other. 4 Our paper demonstrates, both theoretically and empirically, that countries a and b's incentives to form an FTA vary signi…cantly across these three networks. Compared to the empty network, country a has stronger incentives to form an FTA with country b 1 Baldwin (1999) has vividly described the enlargement of a regional trading bloc, one of the causes of the above observation, as a "domino" e¤ect. 2 The three-country model has been the standard formulation in the regionalism literature (see, for example, Krishna, 1998; Saggi, 2006) . We also show in Appendix B that our results generalize to the N > 3 country case. 3 An example of this network is the EU, U.S. and Canada where U.S. and Canada share an FTA (NAFTA) which excludes the EU. 4 Incidentally this indicates that, unlike a customs union, FTAs can be non-transitive. Examples of hub countries include the EU, Chile, and Singapore, which have formed FTAs with a number of countries over time.
when it has an exclusive FTA with country c. The incentives for country b to reciprocate the FTA in this exclusive network are, however, strictly lower. An FTA will therefore only be jointly supported by a and b when a has a su¢ ciently large market size and high marginal cost of production relative to b. In the hub-and-spoke network, the incentives of a and b to form an FTA with each other are a¤ected symmetrically by country c: both countries have greater incentives to link up with each other given the existence of a mutual FTA partner.
[ Figure 2 about here]
We now place our work in the context of the existing literature. A large body of theoretical and empirical literature has been devoted to the analysis of preferential trade agreements. 5 One main strand of the theoretical literature focuses on the economic impacts of FTAs (e.g., Bond et al., 2004; Bond and Syropoulos, 1996; Frankel, 1997; Krugman, 1991; Yi, 1996; Yi, 2000) . Another important strand addresses the relationship between FTAs and multilateral trade liberalization, in particular, whether FTAs constitute building or stumbling "blocs" towards the latter (e.g., Bhagwati and Panagariya, 1996 ; Levy, 1997; Ethier, 1998; Krishna, 1998; Freund, 2000; Saggi, 2006; Ornelas, 2005a; 2005b; Aghion, Antras and Helpman, 2007). 6 Our paper complements these two strands of the literature by emphasizing the interdependent nature of the FTA networks and, in particular, the role of third countries in stimulating or dampening countries'incentives to form new FTAs. 7 The empirical literature on PTAs has been relatively concentrated on evaluating the agreements' ex-post impact on trade ‡ows and has only recently been expanded in two main directions. The …rst direction is led by the contributions by Limao (2006) and Estevadeordal, Freund and Ornelas (2008) , who formally test the debate on whether FTAs constitute building or stumbling blocs towards multinational trade liberalization. By estimating the e¤ect of PTA participations on the level of MFN tari¤ rates, these studies …nd mixed evidence. 5 Krishna (2004) provides an excellent survey of this literature. 6 Some studies, including Goyal and Joshi (2006) and Furusawa and Konishi (2007) , have also sought to characterize the architecture of equilibrium FTA networks and show that global free trade can arise as an equilibrium. Similar to these studies, we are interested in the architecture of FTA network. But instead of characterizing equilibrium networks, we focus on the impact of any given architecture on countries' incentives to sign FTAs. 7 The recent theoretical work by Aghion, Antras and Helpman (2007) also addresses the potential externalities that can arise in the sequential negotiation of FTAs. They focus, however, on how the structure of coalition externalities shapes countries'choice between sequential and multilateral bargaining. Their results indicate that the leading country strictly prefers sequential bargaining when the coalition externalities are negative in at least one of the follower countries and multilateral bargaining when the coalition externalities are positive in both follower countries.
The other major development is marked by the studies of Baier and Bergstrand (2004) and Magee (2003) , who have taken the …rst step to estimate the economic determinants of FTAs. 8 Both these papers …nd that trade creation is one of the main motives for countries to form FTAs. 9 In particular, they show that countries with relatively similar market size, similar factor endowments and geographic proximity are more likely to have FTAs in place. These results shed light on the economic characteristics that play a signi…cant role in countries' selection of preferential trade partners. What they do not capture, however, is the dynamic and cross-country interdependence in the FTA network. First, by examining countries' status of sharing an FTA based on characteristics that do not signi…cantly change over time, these studies do not take into account the evolving nature of the FTA network. The possibility that past FTAs can a¤ect countries'future incentives to form FTAs has not been considered. Second, these analyses have mainly focused on the e¤ect of country-pair characteristics. The role of third countries, in particular, those that have existing preferential trade relationships with the country pair, has not been taken into account. In this paper, we seek to extend these studies by introducing a dynamic network e¤ect and estimating the extent of externalities exerted by third countries on the formation of new FTAs.
We …rst show analytically that when countries are part of an exclusive network, the country that is linked to a third country has stronger incentives to form new FTAs than the case of an empty network. This is because the FTA with the third country -and the consequent increase in imports from there -reduces the country's potential pro…t loss at home as compared to the case of an empty network. It also diverts the country's trade away from others and therefore decreases the country's potential tari¤ revenue loss when it forms additional agreements. The e¤ect of the third country on other countries'incentives to reciprocate the FTA is, however, the opposite. While it increases the other countries' loss of being excluded from preferential treatment, it also dilutes their potential pro…t gain from forming the agreement. The latter e¤ect has been labeled by Ethier (1998) as the concession diversion e¤ect. An FTA will therefore only be jointly supported in an exclusive FTA network when the country with exclusive FTA partners has a su¢ ciently large market size and high marginal cost of production. This result is con…rmed by the empirical evidence. Based on a panel data that covers 80 countries (3160 country pairs) and 15 years (1991-2005), we estimate country pairs' 8 See Baier, Bergstrand and Egger (2007) for a comprehensive discussion on the causes and consequences of regionalism. 9 Baier and Bergstrand (2004) also examine whether country pairs'incentive to avoid trade diversion is present in their decision to form an FTA and …nd supporting evidence.
decision to form an FTA in a given period. 10 Our empirical results suggest that exclusive FTA networks exert on balance a signi…cant and positive e¤ect on countries'probability to form an FTA. This is especially true when the country that is linked to third countries has a relatively large market size and production cost. The positive e¤ect exerted by the exclusive networks also increases with the third countries'marginal cost of productionwhen they cause a smaller concession diversion e¤ect.
We also examine two countries'incentives to form an FTA in a hub-and-spoke network where they are mutually connected to a third country. We …nd, both theoretically and empirically, that the incentives are strengthened by the existence of a mutual FTA partner.
In contrast with the exclusive FTA network where the third country poses opposing e¤ects on the country pair, it a¤ects them in a symmetric fashion here. While it dilutes the spoke countries' potential pro…t gain in each other's market after they form an FTA, it also shares their loss in the home market. According to both theory and empirics, the latter e¤ect outweighs the former leading to a positive net e¤ect on countries'probability to link up.
We address two potential econometric concerns that may arise in the paper: omitted variables and the causality between existing and future FTAs. To reduce the bias from omitted variables, we include both country-time and country-pair …xed e¤ects in the estimations. The former controls for all time-variant country-speci…c factors such as countries'international trade policy at a certain time while the latter takes into account all country-pair speci…c characteristics such as colonial ties. The results remain largely robust. To establish the causal e¤ect of existing FTAs, we propose two strategies: a quasi-natural experimental approach and a propensity-score matching method. In the former, we limit the analysis to consider only the e¤ect of plurilateral trade agreements on the probability of two countries forming a bilateral FTA. The motivation is that, relative to bilateral FTAs, it is less likely that the decision to form a plurilateral agreement, such as the ASEAN, is determined by an individual country's FTA agenda. We also use a propensity-score matching method to address the causal e¤ect of hub-and-spoke networks, in particular, the possibility that a country strategically forms an FTA with another country's partner in the hopes of linking up with that country in a later period. To do so, we match country pairs based on their propensity of sharing a mutual FTA partner and compare their decisions to form an agreement in a later period. We …nd these sensitivity analyses do not change the estimated e¤ects of FTA networks signi…cantly.
To examine how well our estimates predict the data, we obtain the …tted probabilities of two countries forming an FTA at a particular point of time. 59% of the 304 pairs that 1 0 It is worth noting that both Baier and Bergstrand (2004) The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a theoretical model and examines countries'incentives to form an FTA in di¤erent types of network. Section 3 describes the data used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 outlines the main hypotheses derived from the model and discusses the respective econometric results. Section 5 presents the sensitivity analysis. Section 6 interprets the results. The paper concludes in Section 7.
2 The model
Basic framework
In this section, we develop a model that is fairly standard in the regionalism literature and has been adopted in a number of studies including Krishna (1998) 
There is one …rm in each country (also indexed by i 2 fa; b; cg) that produces good x. 11 These …rms pay a constant (and strictly positive) marginal cost i to produce each unit of x, which we assume can di¤er across countries. They also pay unit speci…c trade costs, including both transport cost and tari¤, when they export to foreign countries. We let i j and T i j represent, respectively, the level of transport cost and tari¤ required to export one unit of x from country i to country j where i i = 0 and T i i = 0. We assume that the transport cost is symmetric within each pair of countries, i.e., i j = j i , while tari¤s can be asymmetric between two countries. We also assume that the tari¤ level is non-prohibitive 1 1 It may be noted that the assumption of one …rm is made for analytical convenience. Our results would be equally valid if each country had a …xed number of …rms (see also Goyal and Joshi, 2006 , Section 3.1.2). The main idea is that there exist barriers to entry for new …rms. and, as a result, …rms from each country compete in all three markets.
Under the most-favored-nation (MFN) clause, each country sets a non-discriminatory tari¤, T i , on all trading partners unless there is a bilateral free trade agreement. When that is the case, tari¤s fall to zero between the participating members. The existence of an FTA between i and j is denoted by g ij = 1 while g ij = 0 means that no FTA is in e¤ect. Formally, T j i = T i > 0 if g ij = 0 and T j i = 0 if g ij = 1. We also note that g ii = 1 for each country i and g ij = g ji for each pair of i and j.
Following Goyal and Joshi (2006) and Furusawa and Konishi (2007) , we adopt the notion of a network , g = fg ij g, to describe the FTAs that exist in the considered set of countries N fa; b; cg. In particular, we de…ne a network as an empty network g e when g ij = 0 for all i; j 2 N and a complete network g c when g ij = 1 for all i; j 2 N . We also let N i (g) = fj 2 N : g ij = 1g denote the set of countries, including i, with whom i has an FTA and n i (g) denote the cardinality of this set. Now let us consider …rms'behavior in a given network g. We assume in this model that …rms compete in a Cournot fashion and treat each country as a separate market.
Given these assumptions, …rms from each country, say i, maximize their pro…t for each market given by
choosing the quantity to supply the market, i.e., x i i (g) and x i j (g). This yields
# as the Nash equilibrium output level, with i's aggregate output given by
Firms'Nash-equilibrium pro…ts from their home and export markets can also be written, respectively, as
for j 2 N nfig. It is easy to see that …rms earn a greater pro…t at home when their home countries raise the tari¤s on foreign …rms, i.e.,
, and a lower pro…t abroad when the foreign countries do so, d i j (g)=dT i j (g) < 0. But if the foreign country only raises the tari¤ on the third country, say k (k 6 = i; j), and keeps the tari¤ rates on the other countries constant, then all …rms, except those from country k, will experience an increase in pro…ts, i.e.,
Next we consider the consumers. The aggregate consumption of country i is given
It is clear that consumer surplus is a decreasing function of home-country tari¤s, i.e., dCS i (g)=dT j i (g) < 0, as tari¤s reduce the total quantity of supply and raise the price of the consumption good. Now consider countries'total welfare function in a given FTA network g. The welfare of country i is the sum of consumer surplus, producer pro…ts and tari¤ revenue, i.e.,
Let g + g ij denote the network obtained by replacing g ij = 0 in network g with g ij = 1
and g g ij denote the network obtained by replacing g ij = 1 in network g with g ij = 0.
In any network g, two countries i and j have incentives to form an FTA with each other if
Similarly, a country i has an incentive to unilaterally delete an existing FTA with another country j if
In the following subsections, we examine countries'incentive to form an FTA in various types of FTA networks. In particular, we identify the parametric conditions in each network under which countries a and b have strict incentives to enter into an FTA. We then compare these conditions across networks. This comparison permits us to evaluate how a and b's incentives to form an FTA vary between empty and non-empty networks, and the role of the third country in in ‡uencing these incentives in di¤erent network architectures.
Empty network
We begin with the empty network. In an empty network, two countries (say i and j) will be willing to form an FTA if
Given equations (1)- (3), these conditions are equivalent to
for country i (and analogously for country j). Note, as re ‡ected in the above inequality, i and j's FTA will not a¤ect their export pro…t in the third country because of market segmentation; it will, however, a¤ect i and j's consumer surplus, pro…ts in both the home and partner country, and tari¤ revenue. It is not di¢ cult to see that, as a result of increase in aggregate consumption, i and j's consumer surplus will be unambiguously higher after they enter into an FTA. Their producer surplus, however, can move either way as their …rms gain in the export market but lose at home. It will only increase relative to the empty network when …rms' pro…t gain in the export market o¤sets their loss at home.
Finally, tari¤ revenue will unambiguously fall after the formation of an FTA.
Now de…ne:
and
Simplifying expression (5) gives us the following result:
Lemma 1 In an empty network, countries a and b will form an FTA only if
This indicates that, holding everything else constant, country i will have an incentive to form an FTA with j only if its marginal cost of production is below some threshold value de…ned (as an a¢ ne function) with respect to j's marginal cost. This is analogously true for j. It is easily veri…ed that (7) will be satis…ed if the two countries are relatively similar in terms of their marginal costs. Therefore two countries with relatively similar marginal costs will have strict incentives to jointly support an FTA.
Examining the expression of the threshold value also permits us to evaluate the role of the other parameters in countries'decision to form an FTA. For example, a country's incentive to form an FTA increases with the partner country's market size but decreases with its own. As a result, countries with similar market sizes are more likely to enter into an FTA. Transport cost also enters (7). As seen from (6), when T i and T j are su¢ ciently similar (T j =2 < T i < 2T j ) countries with a lower transport cost are more likely to experience a welfare increase from an FTA and are therefore more likely to enter into an agreement. This result has been labeled in the literature as the "natural trading partner" hypothesis and is one of the key implications from Krugman (1991b) and Frankel et al. (1995 Frankel et al. ( , 1996 Frankel et al. ( , 1998 .
The e¤ect of third-country characteristics is ambiguous here. While a low-cost third country can adversely a¤ect a country's potential pro…t gain in the export market after forming an FTA, it can also share a greater amount of pro…t loss at the country's home market. Only when the latter e¤ect outweighs the former will the two countries'incentives to form an FTA rise with a more e¢ cient third country.
Exclusive network
Let us now consider an exclusive network, For a and b to move from g s to g s + g ab , a and b should both bene…t from forming an FTA in network g s . This requires:
Note because W a (g e + g ac ) must be greater than W a (g e ) for a to have an FTA with c, the …rst condition in (8) also ensures that a is strictly better o¤ as a hub country in network g s + g ab than in the empty network g e , i.e., W a (g e + g ac + g ab ) > W a (g e ).
Given equations (1)- (3), simplifying (8) gives us the following result:
Lemma 2 In an exclusive network g s = g e + g ac , countries a and b will form an FTA only if
1 2 In this and the next sub-section, we assume countries have constant MFN tari¤ rates. This assumption is relaxed in Appendix A where we allow countries to endogenize their MFN tari¤ rates in di¤erent FTA networks. As to be shown, the results remain qualitatively similar given the setup of this model. We …rst present the predictions obtained based on the assumption of constant MFN tari¤ as they help us establish the direct e¤ect of existing FTAs, i.e., how the existing FTAs a¤ect countries' incentives to form new agreements by raising countries'imports from third countries. We then compare this e¤ect in Appendix A with those that are channeled through MFN tari¤s.
Once again, the interpretation is similar to that in section 2.2: a country will …nd it pro…table to form an FTA if its marginal cost is below some threshold de…ned with respect to the partner's marginal cost. The new additive term i (g s ) in the threshold captures the e¤ect of the third country in an exclusive FTA network on i's incentive to form an FTA. It is clear that the parametric range in which country a is willing to form an FTA with country b is unambiguously larger when starting from network g s than starting from the empty network (indicated by a (g s ) > 0). The range for b to reciprocate the FTA is, however, unambiguously smaller (indicated by b (g s ) < 0). These points are illustrated in Figure 3 . In an empty network, a will enter into an FTA with b only if b's marginal cost is above AA whereas country b will do so only if its marginal cost is below BB. An FTA will therefore be supported by both countries only if the combination of their marginal costs is located between the two lines. In an exclusive network where a already has an FTA with c, both of these lines shift downward. The area that supports the FTA becomes
[ Figure 3 about here] This gives us the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Country a's incentive to form an FTA with country b is strictly greater in network g s (= g e +g ac ) than in network g e whereas country b's incentive to reciprocate the FTA is strictly smaller.
The intuition is straightforward. For country a, the existing FTA with c -and the consequent increase in imports from c -will not a¤ect a's pro…t gain in b's market (after a links up with b) but will reduce a's potential pro…t loss at home as compared to the empty network. Furthermore, as a's FTA with c diverts a's trade away from b, the tari¤ revenue a would lose when it eliminates tari¤ on b becomes smaller. Given these considerations, a has a greater incentive to form a free trade agreement with b in network g s . 13 The e¤ect of a and c's FTA on country b is di¤erent. On the one hand, it diverts trade away from b and increases b's loss of being excluded from preferential treatment in both a and c's markets. But on the other hand, it also decreases b's welfare gain from forming the FTA with either a or c by diluting b's potential pro…t gain in these markets. This is the "concession diversion" e¤ect that has been addressed in Ethier (1998). In our model, the latter e¤ect dominates the former, suggesting that country b's incentive to form an FTA with a (or c) unambiguously falls in the exclusive network. Therefore, for b to agree to link up, a must have a su¢ ciently large market size and b must have a su¢ ciently small marginal cost and low transport cost to export to country a.
To complete the discussion, recall we have shown that country a is strictly better o¤ in network g s + g ab than in the empty network. Now let us examine country c's welfare in the new network. We …nd that when
where
, country c would also be strictly better o¤ in g s + g ab than in the empty network g e , i.e., W c (g e +g ac +g ab ) > W c (g e ). Condition (10) essentially requires country c's marginal cost to be su¢ ciently low relative to country a and can be satis…ed while we preserve (9). 14 
Hub-and-spoke network
Suppose the current FTA network is g h = g e + g ac + g bc where there are two FTAs, one between a and c and the other between b and c. Country c is the hub of the network; a and b are the two spokes. We examine a and b's incentive to form an FTA, upon which we move from g h to a complete network g c .
For countries to move from g h to g c , both a and b should bene…t from forming a bilateral free trade agreement, i.e.,
Given equations (1)- (3), simplifying these conditions leads us to the following result:
Lemma 3 In a hub-and-spoke network g h = g e + g ac + g bc , countries a and b will form an FTA only if
1 4 Note this condition also ensures network g s +g ab to be a subgame-perfect equilibrium in settings where we allow countries to have farsighted view of network formation. In other words, it ensures that country c has incentives to form an FTA with a even when it foresees the FTA between a and b. Such farsighted network formation games have been considered by Dutta et al. (2005) and pose a promising area for future research on regionalism.
Note the term i (g h ) di¤ers from i (g s ) and captures the e¤ect of the third country in a hub-and-spoke network on a and b's incentives to form a link. When T a and T b are
suggesting that the parametric space for countries a and b to form an FTA is unambiguously greater in the hub-and-spoke network than in the empty network. 15 This point is illustrated in Figure 4 .
Lines AA and BB, which represent respectively the two conditions in (7), shift outward in a hub-and-spoke network as compared to an empty network. This shift expands the parametric space in which an FTA is supported by both a and b to the area A 00 A 00 OB 00 B 00 .
[ Figure 4 about here]
These results lead us to our next hypothesis:
Proposition 2 Countries a and b's incentives to form an FTA are strictly greater in network g h (= g e + g ac + g bc ) than in network g e . c's preferential access to a and b dilutes the potential pro…t gain the two can achieve in each other's market. This e¤ect, however, is dominated in our model, suggesting that country c exerts a positive net e¤ect on a and b's incentives to link up when it is jointly linked to a and b. 16 
Data
Before turning to the econometric framework, let us …rst discuss the data used in the paper. We employ a panel data of 80 countries and 3160 country pairs. 17 For each 1 5 As to be shown in Appendix A, this condition can be satis…ed for countries with similar market size and similar marginal cost of production, both of which are required for an FTA to be jointly supported. 1 6 Again, similar to Section 2.3, when country c's marginal cost is su¢ ciently low it is strictly better o¤ in the new network g c than the empty network. This also means that it will have an incentive to link up with a and b even when it foresees the FTA between them. 1 7 The country coverage is mainly determined by the availability of labor cost data. For each considered country, we take into account three main economic attributes: market size ( ), marginal cost of production ( ), and transport cost ( ). 19 Speci…cally, we use countries' GDP as a proxy for market size and obtain the data from the World Development Indicators (WDI). To measure the marginal cost of production, we obtain each country's average real unit labor cost where each industry is weighted by its output share. This variable captures not only countries' real wage rate but also their di¤erent levels of labor productivity. We collected the labor cost and output data from several sources including the World Bank Trade and Production Database, the UNIDO, International Labor Organization (ILO) and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and ultimately used the data provided by the World Bank as it covers the largest number of countries. We have also followed Baier and Bergstrand (2004) and Magee (2003) and considered countries'di¤erence in factor endowment ratio as an alternative measure. The results were qualitatively similar. Finally, we use the distance between each country pair's capital cities as a proxy for transport cost and obtain the data from the City Distance explanatory variables for the country pairs that have an FTA and those that do not.
[ Table 1 about here]
4 Econometric framework and results
E¤ect of FTA networks
Now let us outline the main hypotheses obtained from the theoretical model and examine them individually. First, recall Lemmas 1-3 which predict that
Our …rst hypothesis directly follows the above conditions and describes the e¤ect of country-pair characteristics on the decision to form an FTA. To test this hypothesis, we use the following baseline equation:
where g ijt g ijt g ijt 1 is the binary dependent variable that takes the value 1 if countries i and j enter into an FTA in period t and 0 otherwise, 20 (:) is the cumulative probability function, X 0 ijt 1 is a vector of explanatory variables, and " ijt the residuals. 21 2 0 For country pairs that reached an FTA before 1991 (such as the FTA between the U.S. and Israel), gijt = 1 throughout the entire sample period. For these countries, gijt is denoted as missing and will not be included in the sample. They are, however, taken into account when we construct the explanatory variables that represent the existing FTA networks. 2 1 We adopt in this section a …xed-e¤ect Logit model that controls for all time-variant factors. We also considered Cox proportional hazards model and found the results were largely similar. Probit model is not used here because of the incidental parameter problem that would arise with the use of …xed e¤ect. Alternative estimators that control for the potential omitted variables are considered in Section 5.
endogeneity.
Speci…cally, we follow Baier and Bergstrand (2004) 
The X ijt 1 vector consists of the following country-pair characteristics. It includes, …rst, the country pair's average market size, measured by GDP, with the expectation that countries'average market size is positively correlated with their probability to enter into an FTA, i.e., 1 > 0. It also includes the country pair's di¤erence in GDP as hypothesis 1 suggests that countries with similar market sizes are more likely to link up, i.e., 2 < 0.
In addition, the vector incorporates countries'di¤erence in marginal production cost, both in absolute value and squared term. It is expected that countries are more likely to form an FTA when their dissimilarity in costs is within an intermediate range, i.e., 3 > 0 and
The e¤ect of distance is also captured in X 0 ijt 1 and is expected to be negative. Finally, X ijt 1 includes third countries'average marginal cost and average remoteness to the country pair even though the e¤ect of these variables is ambiguous in Section 2. 22 Before estimating equation (13) , let us …rst take a preliminary look at the statistics reported in Table 1 . The statistics there suggest that as compared to the rest of the world countries that have an FTA have, on average, larger and more similar market sizes. They also tend to have smaller di¤erence in unit labor costs and smaller distance. All of these characteristics are consistent with the hypothesis.
[ Table 1 about here] Now let us proceed to estimate equation (13) . The third column of table 2 reports the estimates. The evidence broadly supports hypothesis 1. 23 Countries with larger and similar market size are signi…cantly more likely to enter into an FTA, as indicated by the parameters of ( it 1 + jt 1 )=2 and j it 1 jt 1 j (a 100% increase in countries'average GDP leads to 0.5 percentage point increase in the probability). 24 Countries are also more likely to form an FTA when their di¤erence in marginal cost is within an intermediate range. Distance is found to have an adverse impact: countries that are 100% closer in distance are 2 percentage points more likely to enter into an FTA, suggesting that natural trading partners are more likely to bene…t from FTAs. Finally, countries are more likely to enter into agreements when the rest of the world has relatively competitive unit labor costs.
[ Table 2 about here]
Next we introduce the e¤ect of FTA networks in the estimations. We begin with exclusive FTA networks. Proposition 1 of Section 2 predicts that countries have more incentive to form new FTAs when they already have exclusive FTA partners; the incentive for other countries to reciprocate the FTA is, however, strictly lower. This is re ‡ected in (9) and (12) with a (g s = g e + g ac ) > 0 and b (g s = g e + g ac ) < 0.
As discussed in Section 2.3, this result implies that, as compared to the empty network, an FTA will only be jointly supported in exclusive networks if the country that is currently isolated (i.e., country b in Section 2.3) has a su¢ ciently small market size and a low production cost relative to the country that has existing FTA partners and the two countries are su¢ ciently close. The reason is twofold. First, when countries have a relatively small market size and low cost, they are more likely to derive a positive welfare gain from an FTA even when their partner is already linked to third countries.
Second, these countries' willingness to form an FTA are more likely to be reciprocated by their relatively large and ine¢ cient partners when the latter's incentive is enhanced by the externality from an exclusive network. In the absence of such externalities, the FTA would not generate adequate bene…ts for the latter countries as their gain in export market would not be su¢ ciently large to o¤set their loss in home-market pro…t and tari¤ revenue.
These results are summarized in hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 2 (exclusive network) Countries i and j are more likely to form an FTA in an exclusive network g s = g e + g ik when country i's market size and marginal cost are su¢ ciently large relative to country j and the two countries are su¢ ciently proximate.
To test this hypothesis, we add a new vector of variables to the existing speci…cation, where the …rst right-hand-side term is a constant, the second represents the (relative) market-size di¤erence between i and j, the third measures the (relative) marginal-cost di¤erence between the two, and the last the distance. In contrast with X 0 ijt 1 where i and j enter the equation symmetrically and the two countries' absolute di¤erence in market size and marginal cost is examined, the terms in X s0 25 The summary statistics reported in Table 1 o¤er preliminary insights on this hypothesis. As compared to the rest of the world, a greater percentage of countries that have an FTA belong to an exclusive network. Furthermore, in this group those that have exclusive FTA partners tend to have a relatively larger market size and higher unit labor cost and countries tend to be geographically closer to each other.
Now let us incorporate the new vector of variables in the estimation. The estimating equation now becomes:
The fourth column of table 2 reports the estimates. 26 It is evident that exclusive FTA networks exert a signi…cant e¤ect on countries'incentive to form an FTA. As compared to the empty network, countries'probability to link up is on average 0.5 percentage point higher in exclusive networks. This is especially true when the country with exclusive FTA partners has a su¢ ciently large market size relative to the one without or has a relatively larger unit labor cost. 27 2 5 It is noteworthy that in some cases both countries i and j have exclusive FTA partners. When that is the case, we weigh each country by their number of exclusive FTA partners. We also considered two other treatments. They include (i) weighing each country by the total market size of their exclusive FTA partners and (ii) restricting the de…nition of exclusive networks to cases where only one of the countries has existing FTA partners. The results were not signi…cantly di¤erent. 2 6 While our theory has mainly focused on the role of FTA networks and does not explicitly address the e¤ect of customs union, we controlled for the latter in the empirical analysis by either including a dummy for each existing Customs Union (and the characteristics of CU members) or treating them as a whole. The results were largely similar. The results reported here were obtained based on the former. The estimates suggest that Customs Union members have a greater probability to form new FTAs with nonmembers but other member countries' attributes do not play a signi…cant role. These results were suppressed in the tables but are available from the authors. 2 7 When countries both have exclusive FTA partners, this result (and analogously for the following results) indicates that countries are more likely to link up when the country with a larger number of These results are also illustrated in Figures 5-7 . The solid curves in Figures 5-7 plot the kernel density of countries'probability to link up in an empty network. The dashed curves represent the cases in which countries have exclusive FTA partners. It is evident in Figures 5 and 6 that countries'probability to form an FTA is greater in exclusive networks when the country with exclusive links has a larger market size and higher unit labor cost than the country without. When the reverse is true, i.e., the country with exclusive links has a smaller market size and lower unit labor cost, the probability density curve is indistinguishable from the one in the empty network. This is also true for countries with greater proximity versus those that are relatively distant. Given an exclusive network, the former has a signi…cantly greater probability to form an FTA than the latter; in fact, the latter's likelihood density curve is similar to countries in the empty network.
[ Figures 5-7 about here] Finally, we incorporate the predictions on the hub-and-spoke network into the econometric speci…cation. Recall in Section 2.4 we predicted that countries'incentive to form an FTA unambiguously increases when they are mutually linked to a third country. This is represented in equations (11) and (12) by i (g h ) > 0 and j (g h ) > 0 and gives us our next hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 (hub-and-spoke network) Countries i and j are more likely to form an FTA in a hub-and-spoke network g h = g e + g ik + g jk than in the empty network.
To test this hypothesis, we include an indicator variable, I(g h ijt 1 ), in equation (14). This indicator variable equals to 1 when countries i and j share mutual FTA partners at period t 1 and 0 otherwise. The summary statistics of this variable reported in table 1 suggests that as compared to the rest of the world the percentage of countries that share mutual FTA partners is greater for the group of countries that have an FTA.
The econometric speci…cation now becomes:
where the parameter of I(g h ijt 1 ), denoted by h , is expected to be positive.
The estimates are reported in the last column of table 2. The results suggest that countries are signi…cantly more likely to form an FTA when they are both linked to a exclusive FTA parnters has a su¢ ciently large market size and labor cost relative to the one with fewer partners.
common country. The likelihood, on average, increases by 2 percentage points. Comparing this e¤ect with that of exclusive FTA networks suggests that third countries provide a stronger stimulus to countries' incentives to link up when they are connected to both of them. 28 This …nding is also illustrated in Figure 8 . The density curve of the probability to form an FTA is shifted signi…cantly rightward when countries share mutual FTA partners.
[ Figure 8 about here]
E¤ect of third-country characteristics
So far we have established the e¤ect of third countries on countries'incentive to form an FTA in various FTA networks. But does the e¤ect vary with third-country characteristics?
The theoretical framework employed in this paper, albeit standard in the regionalism literature, does not have direct predictions in this respect because of its linearities in both cost and demand. But it is not di¢ cult to see that third-country characteristics can a¤ect the extent of the e¤ect when there are non-linearities present. We hence explore this issue empirically in the remainder of this section.
Similar to the country-pair characteristics, we take into account three third-country attributes: (i) total market size, (ii) average unit labor cost and (iii) average distance to its partner country in the country pair. In particular, we calculate, in an exclusive network g s = g e +g ik , the cost di¤erence between country k and country j, i.e., kt 1 jt 1 (where g kj = 0). As discussed in Section 2.2, country j is more likely to link up with country i when its marginal cost of production is relatively lower. This means that country k will be less likely to dampen country j's incentive to form an FTA with i in network g s when it is relatively less competitive than country j. The reason is straightforward: Less e¢ cient third countries are less capable of diluting country j's potential pro…t gain in i's market.
[ Table 3 about here]
The estimates in table 3 con…rm the above hypothesis. Exclusive networks are more likely to raise countries'incentive to form an FTA when the third countries have relatively higher unit labor costs. This is also true when third countries have relatively larger 2 8 We also interacted I(g h ijt 1 ) with the vector of explanatory variables, i.e., Xijt 1, and examined how the e¤ect of country-pair characteristics may vary in a hub-and-spoke network. We found that all the interaction terms have a positive and signi…cant paramter, suggesting that, at every given level of Xijt 1, being part of a hub-and-spoke network raises countries'probability to enter an FTA. market size and are relatively proximate. A similar result is also found for countries in the hub-and-spoke networks. The spoke countries are signi…cantly more likely to link up when the hub country is less competitive than the spokes. The e¤ect of market size and distance is, however, insigni…cant in this case.
Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we present a number of sensitivity analyses and examine the robustness of the results. First, we consider alternative country characteristics measure. Speci…cally, we follow Baier and Bergstrand (2004) and Magee (2003) and use countries' di¤erences in factor endowment ratio as a proxy for production cost di¤erences. This allows us to investigate the e¤ect of FTA networks in the exact framework as Baier and Bergstrand (2004) . It also expands the number of countries included in the sample because of the greater coverage of factor endowment data.
We then address two econometric concerns that can arise in the analysis. First, one may argue that there exist omitted variables that a¤ect countries'decision to enter into an FTA. To address this issue, we employ various …xed e¤ects in our estimations below.
The other econometric issue concerns the causal e¤ect of existing FTAs. One may argue that countries self-select into their existing FTA networks because of their expectation of future FTAs. For example, a country may strategically form an FTA with another country's existing FTA partner in the hopes of linking up with that country in a later period. We adopt two strategies to address this concern.
Alternative country characteristics
First, we re-estimate equations (13)- (15) using countries'di¤erences in capital-labor ratio to capture countries'di¤erences in production costs. 29 Baier and Bergstrand (2004) …nds, both theoretically and empirically, that countries whose di¤erences in capital-labor ratio are within an intermediate range are more likely to experience trade creation after forming an FTA and therefore more likely to enter into an agreement. We adopt their measures here and examine the e¤ect of FTA networks in the same speci…cation. 30 To construct a country's capital stock, we assume a depreciation rate ( ) of 7% and calculate the annual capital stocks based on the perpetual inventory method as outlined in Leamer (1984) . 31 To measure labor endowment, we use the size of total labor force.
Both of these data are taken from the World Development Indicators. We then calculate each country pair's absolute di¤erence in capital-labor ratio and their di¤erence from the rest of the world.
As shown in the third column of Table 4 , the results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 2 and existing studies. Speci…cally, countries are more likely to form an FTA when their di¤erence in factor endowment ratio is within an intermediate range. This is consistent with our result in Section 4 where we …nd that countries with intermediate di¤erence in unit labor costs have a greater probability to enter into FTAs. Furthermore, we …nd that countries are less likely to have FTAs when their factor endowment ratio is relatively di¤erent from the rest of the world. Again, this result has been formally predicted by Baier and Bergstrand (2004) .
[ Table 4 about here]
The e¤ect of FTA networks remains similar. Exclusive FTA networks are more likely to stimulate countries'incentive to form FTAs when the two countries'factor endowment ratio (and market size) is su¢ ciently di¤erent -more speci…cally, when the country with exclusive FTA partners has a su¢ ciently large capital-labor ratio (and market size) relative to the one without. This suggests that labor-abundant countries are more likely to be willing to link up with countries that already have FTAs. Hub-and-spoke networks, on the other hand, continue to exert a signi…cant and positive e¤ect as shown in Section 4.
Omitted variables
Next we address the potential concern of omitted variables using a number of …xed e¤ects.
In the third column of table 5, we include a country-pair …xed e¤ect in a linear probability model to capture the e¤ect of all time-invariant country-pair factors such as common language and colonial ties. 32 As shown, the estimates are qualitatively similar to those welfare relative to autarky. He also …nds that bilateral agreements between countries with similar factor endowments are likely to undermine countries'political support for further multilateral trade liberalization. 3 1 The initial value of capital stocks is taken from far enough in the past so that the impact of the initial value on the estimated time series is small.reported in table 2. 33 Both country-pair characteristics and FTA networks remain to have a signi…cant and expected impact on countries'incentives to form FTAs.
Next, we address the potential concern that a country's unobserved characteristics, such as its trade integration policy, may drive both its current FTA network and its incentives to form future FTAs. To do so, we include country-period and partner-period …xed e¤ects in addition to the country-pair dummies. The results are reported in the last column of Table 5 . Again, we …nd signi…cant network e¤ects even though the e¤ect of other variables becomes less important.
[ Table 5 about here]
The causal e¤ect of FTA networks
To address the issue of causality between existing and future FTAs, we …rst take a quasinatural experimental approach by only considering the e¤ect of plurilateral agreements on the probability of two countries forming a bilateral FTA. Two rationales motivate this approach. First, relative to the decision to establish a bilateral FTA between two individual countries, it is less likely that the decision to establish a plurilateral agreement, such as the FTAs between the EU and other countries and the ASEAN, is determined by an individual country's incentive to reach a future FTA with an outsider. Second, many plurilateral agreements, such as the ASEAN and ANDEAN FTAs, have a long history and may hence be considered predetermined.
Since this approach does not consider the e¤ect of bilateral agreements, country pairs that only have bilateral FTA partners are excluded in the analysis. Table 6 reports the results. We …nd that the e¤ect of existing hub-and-spoke network remains largely similar to the previous estimates but plurilateral exclusive FTA partners tend to exert, on average, an adverse e¤ect on countries'probability to form new agreements. This is not surprising given that countries' potential pro…t gain in a foreign market is expected to decrease in that market's number of preferential trade partners. This adverse e¤ect is, however, smaller when the third countries have relatively high unit labor cost, a result that is consistent with hypothesis 2.
[ Table 6 about here]
Next we use a propensity-score matching technique as an alternative strategy to dis-entangle the causal e¤ects. 34 We focus, in particular, on the causality between countries' sharing a mutual FTA partner (i.e., treatment variable) and their decision to form an agreement (i.e., outcome variable). While one may also question the causal e¤ect of existing exclusive FTA networks, this concern is mitigated when we include country-time …xed e¤ect (in Table 5 ) which controls for all time-variant country-speci…c factors such as trade integration policy.
The objective of the propensity-score matching method is to match -for each country (say, i) -a potential FTA partner (j) with whom i shares a mutual FTA partner (i.e., treated group) with another nation (m) (i.e., control group). The matching criteria is that the two pairs (i and j versus i and m) are su¢ ciently similar in main characteristics and the propensity to share a mutual FTA partner, except the latter pair does not actually have one. The two pairs'decisions to form an FTA in the next period are then compared.
If the former pair is found to be signi…cantly more or less likely to sign an FTA than its match pair, we consider the di¤erence as the average treatment e¤ect on the treated (ATT) of having mutual FTA partners. The details of implementing this approach are described below. 35 When two countries, say i and j, both have an FTA with a third country k at period t, it indicates that g ikt = g jkt = 1 and i and j belong to a hub-and-spoke network g h ijt . Our task here is to estimate this possibility in the following model:
where ( 
where l 6 = i; j and I(g h ilt ) = 0. 36 Now we are ready to establish the causal e¤ect of having mutual FTA partners. In particular, we examine whether the di¤erence in matched country pairs'decision to form an FTA in the next period, i.e., g ij(t+1) g im(t+1) , is attributable to the di¤erence in their actual status of sharing mutual FTA partners, i.e., I(g h ijt ) I(g h imt ). Table 7 reports the estimates. We …nd that country pairs that actually share mutual FTA partners are signi…cantly more likely to reach an agreement than their matches.
[ Table 7 about here]
Interpreting the results
In this section, we follow Baier and Bergstrand (2004) and examine how well the estimates predict the actual data. To do so, we obtain the …tted probabilities of two countries forming an FTA in a given period based on estimates reported in the last column of Table   5 . 37 In the context of qualitative choice models, higher predicted probabilities of signing an FTA are associated with greater potential welfare gains. We …rst consider the country pairs whose predicted probabilities of entering into an FTA in a given period exceed 0.5.
We …nd 181 (or 59%) of the 304 pairs that established an FTA between 1991 and 2005 satisfy this criteria when they signed the agreement.
However, to the remaining 123 (or 41%) of the 304 pairs, the predicted probabilities in the period when the agreements were formed are less than 0.5. This suggests that the welfare gains from forming these FTAs are not su¢ ciently large or their timing was not optimal. Among this group of countries, Chile, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and South Africa committed to particularly more agreements than predicted.
Our results also predict that 94 (4%) of the 2313 country pairs in our sample that did not have an FTA before 2005 would derive a su¢ cient welfare gain from signing a bilateral agreement in 2005. These countries include, for example, Mexico, Israel, China, Singapore, Algeria, and most EU members. We notice that 30 (32%) of these 94 country pairs have indeed either signed an agreement in 2006 or entered negotiations. 38 We investigate in this paper the e¤ect of existing FTA networks on countries' incentive to form new FTAs. While the existing literature has provided important insights on the country-pair determinants of FTAs, the potential externalities exerted by existing FTA partners remain largely underinvestigated. We show, both theoretically and empirically, that such externalities play an important role in countries' decision to enter into FTAs.
Furthermore, the extent of these externalities is crucially conditional on the architecture of the network and the attributes of third countries.
First, we show that exclusive FTA networks pose opposing e¤ects on countries'incentives to form an agreement. Countries that are currently linked to third countries have a stronger motive to form new links whereas those that are currently isolated have a weaker incentive to reciprocate. This is not surprising given that the former's potential pro…t loss in the home market from forming a new FTA is now shared with its FTA partners whereas the latter's potential pro…t gain in the export market is diluted. An FTA will therefore only be jointly supported if the former country has a su¢ ciently large market size and a relatively high marginal cost of production so that other countries can still receive su¢ -cient gains from linking up with them in spite of the presence of their preferential trade partners. This hypothesis is broadly con…rmed by the empirical evidence. Exclusive FTA networks are more likely to stimulate new FTAs when the country with exclusive FTA partners has a relatively larger market size and higher unit labor cost. This is similarly true when third countries'unit labor costs are relatively higher.
We also examine the e¤ect of hub-and-spoke networks in which two countries share a mutual FTA partner. We show that while the hub (third) country dilutes the spoke countries'potential pro…t gain in each other's market, it also shares their potential pro…t loss at home. The theory predicts that the latter e¤ect outweighs the former, leading to a positive net e¤ect on countries'incentive to form FTAs. This hypothesis is supported empirically. We …nd a signi…cant and positive network e¤ect from the hub-and-spoke networks. Countries are more likely to form an FTA when they share mutual FTA partners.
The results also remain largely robust when we address the potential concerns of omitted variables and reverse causality between existing and future FTAs using, respectively, …xed e¤ects and matching techniques.
While this analysis has taken the step to analyze third-country e¤ects in countries' incentives to form new FTAs, it can be extended in two directions. First, it can be extended to explore countries'decision to link up with more than one partner at a time.
base. Those that are currently in the process of negotiation are complied from online sources including www.bilaterals.org.
It is possible that these links are not bene…cial to the country individually but would be if they were formed jointly. This type of externality has not been examined in the literature and poses an interesting area for future research. Second, while this paper has partly addressed the potential reverse causality between existing and future FTAs, this topic can be further exploited both theoretically and empirically. Studies that allow countries to take a far-sighted view of network formation will deepen our understanding of how FTAs evolve over time.
A. endogenous MFN tari¤
In Section 2, we have assumed countries'MFN tari¤s remain constant across networks.
We explore here the case in which countries may adjust their MFN tari¤ rates after they form FTAs. Similar to Section 2, we begin with an empty network. It is not di¢ cult to see that countries'optimal tari¤ rate in network g e is given by
where i = a; b; c.
Now suppose a has formed an FTA with c; this leads to an exclusive network g s = g e + g ac . Country a's MFN tari¤ in this network is
Comparing equation (20) with (19) suggests that T a (g s ) is strictly lower than T a (g e ) i¤ We then re-examine the conditions in (9) and …nd that for all T a (g s ) T a (g e ),
This suggests that when country a lowers its MFN tari¤ rate after forming an FTA with c, a has stronger incentives to form an FTA with b. Country b's incentive to reciprocate the FTA is, however, weakened. The intuition is straightforward. At a lower MFN tari¤ rate, a will experience a smaller loss in its home-market pro…t and tari¤ revenue when it links up with b. Country b, on the other hand, will experience a smaller gain in export pro…t. Our previous result, described in Proposition 1, remains unchanged. Now let us consider a hub-and-spoke network. In this case, both a and b have incentives to lower their external tari¤ to the level given in (20) . 40 This has two e¤ects on countries a and b's incentives to grant each other preferential treatment. On the one hand, they become less motivated to obtain preferential access to each other's market as the partner country lowers its MFN tari¤. But on the other hand, they also expect a smaller loss in the home market for both home-market pro…t and tari¤ revenue because of their own lower MFN tari¤ rate. We …nd that when the two countries'MFN tari¤ rates are su¢ ciently similar, the latter e¤ect dominates the former and the conditions in (12) continue to hold, i.e., for i; j = a; b
The result outlined in Proposition 2 therefore remains true.
B. the case of N countries
We now show that restricting ourselves to the 3-country model does not involve any essential loss of generality. Our results on the incentives of countries a and b to form an FTA as a function of the current network architecture remains robust when we generalize the model to the case of N > 3 countries. We focus here on the results regarding the exclusive FTA network. 41 We begin with the empty network. Starting from the empty network, a has a strict incentive to form an FTA with b if:
where we now have:
A similar expression holds for country b. Therefore, as in Lemma 1, country a is willing to form an FTA with b if its marginal cost is below some threshold with respect to b's marginal cost (and likewise for b). 4 1 The results on the hub-and-spoke network can be analogously derived.
Now consider the incentives of a and b to form an FTA when they are part of some exclusive network g. Let N a (g) = fi ; g ia = 1 in gg denote the set of FTA partners of country a in the network g and n a (g) denote the number of countries in this set. Likewise, N b (g) denotes b's FTA partners in the network g and n b (g) denotes the number of countries with which b has an FTA. Without loss of generality, we assume that n a (g) > n a (g).
We can then show that a has a strict incentive to form an FTA with b if:
where: Notes: (i) Standard errors are reported in the parentheses and clustered at the country pair level; (ii) ***, **, and * represent statistical signi…cance at respectively 1%, 5%, and 10%. Notes: (i) Standard errors are reported in the parentheses and clustered at country pair level; (ii) ***, **, and * represent statistical signi…cance at respectively 1%, 5%, and 10%. Notes: (i) Standard errors are reported in the parentheses and clustered at the country-pair level; (ii) ***, **, and * represent statistical signi…cance at respectively 1%, 5%, and 10%. Notes: (i) Standard errors are reported in the parentheses and clustered at country pair level; (ii) ***, **, and * represent statistical signi…cance at respectively 1%, 5%, and 10%. Notes: (i) Standard errors are reported in the parentheses and clustered at country pair level; (ii) ***, **, and * represent statistical signi…cance at respectively 1%, 5%, and 10%. Notes: (i) Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in the parentheses; (ii) ***, **, and * represent statistical signi…cance at respectively 1%, 5%, and 10%.
